Rushes in Large Timing Games
| Autor: | Axel Anderson, Lones Smith, Andreas Park |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
021103 operations research 05 social sciences Stochastic game 0211 other engineering and technologies Bank run Advertising 02 engineering and technology medicine.disease Subgame perfect equilibrium Stopping time 0502 economics and business Economics medicine First-mover advantage Attrition 050207 economics Mathematical economics Timing game Quantile |
| Zdroj: | Econometrica. 85:871-913 |
| ISSN: | 0012-9682 |
| Popis: | We develop a continuum player timing game that subsumes standard wars of attrition and pre-emption games, and introduces a new rushes phenomenon. Payoffs are continuous and single-peaked functions of the stopping time and stopping quantile. We show that if payoffs are hump-shaped in the quantile, then a sudden “rush” of players stops in any Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium. Fear relaxes the first mover advantage in pre-emption games, asking that the least quantile beat the average; greed relaxes the last mover advantage in wars of attrition, asking just that the last quantile payoff exceed the average. With greed, play is inefficiently late: an accelerating war of attrition starting at optimal time, followed by a rush. With fear, play is inefficiently early: a slowing pre-emption game, ending at the optimal time, preceded by a rush. The theory predicts the length, duration, and intensity of stopping, and the size and timing of rushes, and offers insights for many common timing games. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Plný text