Can exclusive territories limit strategic location downstream?*

Autor:	Kenneth Fjell, John S. Heywood
Rok vydání:	2005
Předmět:	Market economy Geography Planning and Development Economics Social Welfare Price discrimination Environmental Science (miscellaneous) Monopoly Vertical control Profit (economics)
Zdroj:	Papers in Regional Science. 84:221-237
ISSN:	1435-5957 1056-8190
DOI:	10.1111/j.1435-5957.2005.00014.x
Popis:	Research on spatial price discrimination demonstrates that strategic (off centre) location choices by downstream firms can increase downstream profit and reduce both the profit of an upstream monopoly and social welfare. This article examines exclusive territories as a vertical control mechanism and shows that such territories can force downstream firms to return to the centre of the market. However, exclusive territories cannot completely eliminate the influence of strategic downstream location - the profit maximising exclusive territories are either too small or too large to be socially efficient. JEL classification: L19, L22
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2c87c69be4b361c411558abf49eab147 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1435-5957.2005.00014.x Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF