KEPUTUSAN HARGA TRANSFER: PERAN TUNNELING INCENTIVE DAN MINIMASI PAJAK

Autor:	Febri Dwi Riyadi, Etik Kresnawati
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Nonprobability sampling Microeconomics Incentive Shareholder Order (exchange) Stock exchange Service (economics) media_common.quotation_subject Transfer pricing Pharmacology (medical) Business Database transaction media_common
Zdroj:	AKUNTABILITAS. 15:35-54
ISSN:	2685-7030 1978-4392
Popis:	Transfer price is a transaction for determining the selling price of a service, intangible assets, and goods to parties who have a special relationship which opens up opportunities for abuse of power by management and controlling shareholders. This study aims to examine the effect of tunneling incentives and tax minimization, which are thought to motivate management in deciding transfer prices. With the purposive sampling method, a total of 58 non-BUMN manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange were obtained in 2018. The test results with multivariate regression showed that tunneling incentives had no effect on transfer pricing. However, tax minimization by management has a negative effect on transfer pricing. This results indicate that the determination of transfer prices is more motivated by management's expectations in order to minimize taxes in the next period.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2ba3cb9e88d4099edfa23ad5f8926bf1 https://doi.org/10.29259/ja.v15i1.13583 Zobrazit plný text záznamu