Job search under asymmetric information: endogenous wage dispersion and unemployment stigma

Autor:	Brennan C. Platt, Shuaizhang Feng, Lars Lefgren, Bingyong Zheng
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Labour economics media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Wage dispersion Wage Information asymmetry Model parameter 0502 economics and business Unemployment Economics 050206 economic theory 050205 econometrics media_common Public finance
Zdroj:	Economic Theory. 67:817-851
ISSN:	1432-0479 0938-2259
Popis:	We present a model of directed job search with asymmetric information regarding worker type. While job applicants know their productivity type, firms can only observe the duration of unemployment as well as a noisy signal of worker type. Firms can offer an unscreened wage or a wage that is conditioned on passing the screening and the duration of unemployment. This framework leads to three possible equilibria which depend on model parameter values. We describe the circumstances under which each equilibrium may result and the empirical implications of each equilibrium. Our model sheds light into wage scarring, unemployment duration, wage dispersion and firm-wage sorting, as well as the effects of unemployment insurance and minimum wages on search behavior and the distribution of wages.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2b762fe9b0aa67f58859ff6ddfbf514c https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1099-7 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink