Production inefficiency, cross-ownership and regional tax-range coordination

Autor:	Mutsumi Matsumoto
Rok vydání:	2019
Předmět:	Tax competition media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Pareto principle 0506 political science Microeconomics Capital (economics) 0502 economics and business Cross ownership 050602 political science & public administration Economics Minimum capital 050207 economics Business and International Management Inefficiency General Economics Econometrics and Finance Welfare Public finance media_common
Zdroj:	Economics of Governance. 20:371-388
ISSN:	1435-8131 1435-6104
DOI:	10.1007/s10101-019-00229-z
Popis:	Using a simple asymmetric capital-tax competition model where the allocation of mobile capital is distorted in non-cooperative equilibrium, this paper analyzes the welfare impact of regional tax coordination on a range of possible tax rates (a combination of maximum and minimum capital taxes made by a subset of regions). Under the assumption that the ownership of immobile factors (e.g., business land) is diversified across regions, a new possibility of beneficial coordination arises which has not been identified before: tax-range coordination “among capital-exporting regions” or “among capital-importing regions” may improve the welfare of all regions. This is in contrast to the case without cross-ownership where both capital-exporting and capital-importing regions must be involved in tax-range coordination in order to achieve a Pareto improvement.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::29b4e91e314dd1e6279d5371ef639d16 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-019-00229-z Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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