Workshop 1: Surveillance Issues of Pandemic Influenza
| Autor: | K. Nerome, K. F. Shortridge, FL Ruben, L Haaheim, N Arden, H Zimmerman, AS Monto, H Regnery, C Hannoun, AW Hampson |
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| Rok vydání: | 1997 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | The Journal of Infectious Diseases. 176:S73-S75 |
| ISSN: | 1537-6613 0022-1899 |
| DOI: | 10.1086/514181 |
| Popis: | The purpose of this workshop was to review the status of regions so that if a pandemic strain arises in these vast areas, it may be detected. Various models may be adopted for this pursurveillance activities and to recommend new approaches necessary to detect and control pandemics. The specific questions pose; one that has proven successful would be to create ‘‘twinning’’ or sister laboratories. The developed country laboratory that the panel addressed were as follows: • Is the current global surveillance network equipped to rapwould adopt the facility in the less-developed country and provide advice for and assistance in improving capabilities. These efforts idly detect a new pandemic strain of influenza, to monitor the impact as the virus spreads, and to disseminate surveillance are not without costs in time, travel, and equipment. The World Health Organization (WHO), through its collaboinformation in a timely manner? • How can surveillance data be used to control a pandemic? rating centers in London, Atlanta, and now Melbourne, has taken the lead in working with a network of national labora• What are the ways by which increased research efforts can improve virologic and disease surveillance? tories. Alan Hampson described the history of WHO and the development of the concept of the networks of National InfluThe panel agreed that adequate surveillance is critical for the prompt detection of influenza variants, including strains of enza Centres. However, at present, only C60 countries have national centers, and these function at various levels of activity. pandemic potential. Both the detection of the viruses and the diseases they cause are components of this effort, which, by While surveillance activity has increased in some countries, in particular China, it is important to realize that similar condiits very nature, must be international in scope. Surveillance questions were examined formally by the group, which intions for transmission exist in many areas of South and Southeast Asia and that it is impossible to obtain either specimens cluded participants from France, Norway, Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, and the United States. or data from these areas. Another issue that needs to be considered in improving the collection of potential pandemic viruses is the substrate to be Current Global Surveillance Networks used. If eggs are not available, is there a cell line that can be used? Also, is that cell line going to be acceptable if the virus Claude Hannoun, chair of the session, reported on two issues: the methods used over many years in France and now in other isolate turns out to be one that should be a candidate for the new vaccine and there is insufficient time available to isolate countries in Western Europe for surveillance and the absence of laboratories in certain parts of the world. In Europe, a system another representative virus in a suitable substrate? These issues need to be considered as laboratories with capabilities to of sentinel physicians collects samples for virus isolation from practices covering large geographic areas. Specimens are transcollect and process specimens and to identify and characterize new isolates are recruited. ported to central laboratories, and recovery of viruses has been good. As a result, it has been possible to recognize quickly the China remains a focus both in terms of dense population, which in the past had little sampling of influenza viruses, and occurrence of influenza outbreaks and to let physicians and the public know about the timing and virus strains involved in the the well-known likelihood that new pandemic strains arise from this region. Helen Regnery reviewed the existing virologic suroutbreaks. Studies are underway, sponsored by the European Scientific Working Group on Influenza, to better define the veillance program in China, which has been organized and supported by the WHO collaborating center at the Centers for impact of influenza in the European region. Hanspeter Zimmerman reported on the Swiss system of sentinel physician surveilDisease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta since 1989. Currently, eight surveillance sites have been established in diflance, which was developed so that attack rates could be generated for various regions of the country. ferent geographic locations. Each site collects specimens from persons with acute respiratory disease and performs the initial Other parts of the world are less well covered by laboratories, and in some extensive regions, especially in Africa, laboratories isolation. After isolation, influenza viruses are transported to the Institute of Virology in Beijing, where samples are lyophiwith the capability of identifying viruses simply do not exist. Contacts have been made to help develop laboratories in these lized and forwarded to the CDC for further characterization. Information provided with submitted specimens includes collection date, the patient’s age and geographic location, and the extent of influenza activity in the area at the time of specimen Chair: Claude Hannoun; rapporteur: Nancy H. Arden; participants: Lars collection. Haaheim, Alan W. Hampson, Arnold S. Monto, Kuniaki Nerome, Helen Regnery, Frederick L. Ruben, Kennedy F. Shortridge, and Hanspeter Zimmerman. Held at: Pandemic Influenza: Confronting a Re-emergent Threat, Bethesda, Use of Surveillance Data to Control Pandemics Maryland, 11–13 December 1995. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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