Structural fund, endogenous move and commitment

Autor:	Carsten Eckel, Yutao Han, Kate Hynes, Jin Zhang
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Microeconomics Competition (economics) Economics and Econometrics Accounting Structural fund Economics Social Welfare Production function Economic surplus Outcome (game theory) Finance Public finance
Zdroj:	International Tax and Public Finance. 28:465-482
ISSN:	1573-6970 0927-5940
DOI:	10.1007/s10797-020-09641-2
Popis:	In this paper, we extend the study on combined tax and infrastructure competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by asymmetric countries. We consider how a structural fund affects the endogenous move decision and show that the poor country prefers to be a follower only when the production function is sufficiently concave. We also analyse the effect of the structural fund on total welfare and design a commitment game to ensure that the socially optimal outcome is achieved.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2837d989f73cdf45bc90ecd05695f4de https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-020-09641-2 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink