International environmental agreements with the formation of multiple coalitions

Autor:	Nobuyuki Takashima
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Microeconomics Economics and Econometrics MathematicsofComputing_GENERAL Economics Repeated game TheoryofComputation_GENERAL
Zdroj:	Applied Economics Letters. 30:524-530
ISSN:	1466-4291 1350-4851
DOI:	10.1080/13504851.2021.1996528
Popis:	This paper examines the formation of multiple coalitions under the umbrella of an international environmental agreement. Using a repeated game, we demonstrate that in any coalition structure consis...
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2764ab582b3f48bbb070515abb77e451 https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2021.1996528 Zobrazit plný text záznamu