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In the face of widespread DEP and ASLR deploy- ment, JIT spraying brings together the best of code injection and code reuse attacks to defeat both defenses. However, to date, JIT spraying has been an x86-only attack thanks to its reliance on variable-length, unaligned instructions. In this paper, we finally extend JIT spraying to a RISC architecture by introducing a novel technique called gadget chaining, whereby high level code invokes short sequences of unintended and intended instructions called gadgets just like a function call. We demonstrate gadget chaining in an end-to-end JIT spraying attack against WebKit's JavaScriptCore JS engine on ARM and found that existing JIT spray mitigations that were sufficient against the x86 version of the JIT spraying attack fall short in the face of gadget chaining. I. INTRODUCTION It is no secret that programs are replete with bugs. Some of these bugs allow an attacker to subvert control of the program counter and divert execution away from its intended path; these are called control flow vulnerabilities. Unfortunately for a would-be attacker, a control flow vulnerability is not enough to execute arbitrary code on a remote machine. Defense mechanisms such as DEP and ASLR prevent attackers from writing code into a process's address space and decrease the likelihood that triggering a control flow vulnerability will cause an attacker's target code to execute. JIT spraying is an attack which defeats both DEP and ASLR by enabling an attacker to predictably influence large swaths of the victim process's executable memory. The attack exploits Just-in-Time compilers built into many recent lan- guage runtimes for the purpose of speeding up the performance of frequently-executed code, but it has only been demonstrated for the x86 architecture. More and more handheld devices, which are predominantly powered by ARM processors, are connecting to the Internet and running web browsers, making themselves candidates for remote exploitation. Since most modern web browsers implement a JavaScript runtime environ- ment with a fully-functioning JIT compiler, JIT spraying is a fantastic vector for attacking a browser. However, JIT spraying has historically been limited to the x86 architecture. In this paper, we challenge this trend and show that JIT spraying is indeed a viable attack against ARM. |
