| Popis: |
This paper examines the jurisprudential work of Jeremy Waldron. More specifically, it seeks to articulate a comprehensive account of Professor Waldron's thoughts on jurisprudence, locating it between two opposing conceptions of law: namely, legal positivism and Ronald Dworkin's law as integrity. I shall argue that rather than being (merely) a “normative positivist”, Jeremy Waldron offers a rich, complex theory that, in being able to reconcile aspects of both legal positivism and law as integrity, has enough to be classified as a third theory. The first part of this paper briefly considers how the tradition of legal positivism has developed and changed throughout the years. Later, this paper explores, generally, Ronald Dworkin's conception of law and his challenges to legal positivism. Drawing upon that, I shall attempt to offer an account of the core elements that constitute Jeremy Waldron's philosophy of law, casting light on the similarities and differences between his account and both Dworkin's and the positivists’. Finally, I shall claim that Waldron offers a perspective that combines important insights from theories that might be considered antithetical to one another and, in doing so, lays the foundations — and the case — for a democratic jurisprudence. |
