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Spansh Abstract: El presente estudio busca comprobar si la autonomia de la Banca Central en Colombia, adquirida a partir de la Carta Politica de 1991, logro controlar de manera adecuada los margenes de inflacion a traves de la no monetizacion de los deficits del Gobierno; o si por el contrario, esto no influyo en la determinacion del nivel de precios. Para ello se estiman dos modelos de correccion de errores (VEC) entre el deficit fiscal operativo del Gobierno Nacional Central como porcentaje del PIB y la inflacion anual (ambas series integradas de orden 1 i1 ), con informacion anual: el primero de 1963 a 1990, y el segundo, de 1991 a 2010. Mediante el test de Granger se concluye que si existio una relacion de causalidad del deficit fiscal a la inflacion antes de la independencia del Banco de la Republica, pero que despues de esta, no existe correspondencia alguna.English Abstract: This research aims to determine whether the autonomy of the Central Bank in Colombia, acquired since the Constitution of 1991, achieved to control properly the margins of inflation by not monetizing the government deficits, or if instead it had no influence in determining the price level. To do this, it is estimated two models of error correction (VEC) between the operating budget deficit of the Central Government as a percentage of GDP and the annual inflation (both series are integrated of order 1 i1 ); it is used annual information for the earlier model from 1963 to 1990, and for the former model from 1991 to 2010. Granger's test concludes that there was a causal link from the fiscal deficit to inflation before the independence of the Central Bank of Colombia, but after this independence, there is no relationship between these variables. |
