Asset Specificity and Corporate Political Activity in Regulated Industries

Autor:	Rajeev J. Sawant
Rok vydání:	2012
Předmět:	Transaction cost Politics Process management Management of Technology and Innovation Strategy and Management Public policy ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Business General Business Management and Accounting Asset specificity Industrial organization
Zdroj:	Academy of Management Review. 37:194-210
ISSN:	1930-3807 0363-7425
DOI:	10.5465/amr.2010.0022
Popis:	I examine corporate political activity in regulated industries, which is conceptualized in the literature as transactions in a political marketplace. I incorporate transaction costs in political markets and propose that under high asset specificity, corporate political activity and internalization are substitutes because favorable public policy also mitigates asset specificity. Firms choose corporate political activity when transaction costs are lower than internalization costs. I outline conditions that lower transaction costs and analyze how firms lower transaction costs by embedding political transactions in policy networks.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::24eb6f75e780964e9f342afa43daed9a https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.0022 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF