Autonomy and Monitoring
Autor: | Pedro Ortín-Ángel, Eduardo C. Rodes, Marco A. Barrenechea-Méndez |
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Rok vydání: | 2016 |
Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Process management ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences General Business Management and Accounting Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business Positive relationship Operations management Business 050207 economics Autonomy 050205 econometrics media_common |
Zdroj: | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 25:911-935 |
ISSN: | 1058-6407 |
Popis: | This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
Externí odkaz: | |
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