Autonomy and Monitoring

Autor: Pedro Ortín-Ángel, Eduardo C. Rodes, Marco A. Barrenechea-Méndez
Rok vydání: 2016
Předmět:
Zdroj: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 25:911-935
ISSN: 1058-6407
Popis: This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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