Origins of Corporate Governance in the USA, Sweden and France
| Autor: | Philippe Very, Michael Lubatkin, Sven-Olaf Collin, Peter J. Lane |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2005 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Strategy and Management Corporate governance 05 social sciences Institutional economics Principal–agent problem Context (language use) Politics Then test Economy Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business Historical sociology Sociology 050207 economics 050203 business & management |
| Zdroj: | Organization Studies. 26:867-888 |
| ISSN: | 1741-3044 0170-8406 |
| DOI: | 10.1177/0170840605054602 |
| Popis: | We reason that agency theory’s behavioral assumptions may too closely reflect the US institutional context to explain the governance heritages that exist elsewhere. We propose that what constitutes opportunistic behavior and what can be done to limit it may vary due to differences in national background and formal institutions. We then test the validity of this nationally bounded model using historical sociology analysis of three nations whose corporate governance heritages are believed to differ (USA, Sweden, and France). Specifically, we review their political, cultural, and economic institutions to explore the different ways that their governance practices have evolved and infer causes for these historical variations. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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