Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policy-making

Autor:	Ian R. Turner, Keith E. Schnakenberg
Rok vydání:	2019
Předmět:	Dilemma Value (ethics) Incentive Sociology and Political Science Corruption Policy making media_common.quotation_subject Political Science and International Relations Potential source Business Welfare media_common Law and economics
Zdroj:	American Political Science Review. 113:762-777
ISSN:	1537-5943 0003-0554
DOI:	10.1017/s0003055419000169
Popis:	Lobbying is a potential source of corruption but is also a valuable source of information for policy-makers. We analyze a game-theoretic model that shows how the threat of corruption affects the incentives of noncorrupt politicians to enlist the help of lobbyists to make more informed decisions. Politicians face a dilemma because voters cannot always tell whether a politician allows access to lobbyists to solicit corruption or to seek information. Thus, a noncorrupt politician may deny access to lobbyists to signal that she is noncorrupt even though doing so impedes her ability to make good policy. This signaling may decrease the welfare of the voters depending on the value of the lost policy information relative to the value of screening out corrupt politicians.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::213261f3a932d78e3f375dad42d0882a https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000169 Zobrazit plný text záznamu