Chosen-input side-channel analysis on unrolled light-weight cryptographic hardware
| Autor: | Takafumi Aoki, Ville Yli-Mayry, Naofumi Homma |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Profiling (computer programming)
021110 strategic defence & security studies Computer science business.industry Cycles per instruction Real-time computing 0211 other engineering and technologies Cryptographic hardware 02 engineering and technology Encryption Cipher 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Key (cryptography) 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing Side channel attack Hardware_ARITHMETICANDLOGICSTRUCTURES Latency (engineering) business Computer hardware |
| Zdroj: | ISQED |
| DOI: | 10.1109/isqed.2017.7918332 |
| Popis: | Lightweight ciphers designed with a fully unrolled architecture, capable of encryption/decryption in a single clock cycle, have gained momentum in the last few years. They've shown that very low latency encryption/decryption is possible with modest costs in comparison with traditional round-based designs. This paper explores how to most efficiently perform side-channel analysis against such unrolled cryptographic hardware in a setting where the adversary may freely choose the plaintexts processed by the target cipher. We present a method for choosing plaintexts for a straightforward recovery of the encryption/decryption key by side-channel analysis without any template attack-like profiling phase of the device. Finally, we demonstrate the validity of our method with experiments on fully unrolled implementations of PRINCE and MANTIS. The result shows that our chosen-input attack is significantly more efficient than the corresponding known-input attacks. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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