Should straw polls be banned?
| Autor: | S. Nageeb Ali, J. Aislinn Bohren |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Principal (computer security) ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Deliberation Voting Information aggregation 0502 economics and business Collusion 050206 economic theory Business 050207 economics Finance media_common Law and economics |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 118:284-294 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.006 |
| Popis: | A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or “deliberating” before voting. Our main result is that if the committee plays its preferred equilibrium and the Principal uses a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation. We show using examples how she can gain if she can choose the equilibrium played by the committee, or use a non-anonymous or non-monotone voting rule. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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