You catch more flies with honey: an analysis of PAC punishment and congressional vote switching
| Autor: | Joshua M. Jansa |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Sociology and Political Science
Punishment media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Public policy Context (language use) Resistance (psychoanalysis) Political communication 0506 political science Politics of the United States Political economy 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Voting behavior 050207 economics Free trade media_common |
| Zdroj: | Interest Groups & Advocacy. 8:184-207 |
| ISSN: | 2047-7422 2047-7414 |
| DOI: | 10.1057/s41309-019-00053-0 |
| Popis: | Previous research demonstrates that interest groups punish congressional allies by withholding campaign contributions. But, past studies did not indicate whether this punishment strategy is effective at getting members of Congress to change their voting behavior. The literature on vote switching in Congress ignores how legislators may respond to pressure, in the form of punishment, from allied interest groups. We propose competing hypotheses. Punishment could cause incumbents to switch their vote, but punishment may also be seen as an unwelcome tactic and met with resistance from incumbents. We also hypothesize that rewards will lead to more vote switching. We test this theory in the context of labor PAC punishment and reward of House Democrats who voted for free trade. We find that punishment backfires by making incumbents less likely to switch their vote on trade. We also find that rewards from labor PACs make it more likely that incumbent Democrats will switch their vote, while rewards from business PACs make it much less likely. We conclude with thoughts on the importance of understanding the effect of interest group tactics on vote switching in Congress and how labor’s strategic choices may affect its influence in American politics. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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