Ready to reform: How popular initiatives can be successful
| Autor: | Christian Marti, Monika Bütler, Katharina Eva Hofer |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Sequential game Status quo business.industry media_common.quotation_subject Compromise 05 social sciences Public administration Public relations 16. Peace & justice Popularity 0506 political science Test (assessment) Politics Incentive 0502 economics and business Political Science and International Relations 050602 political science & public administration Petitioner Business 050207 economics media_common |
| Zdroj: | European Journal of Political Economy. 48:16-39 |
| ISSN: | 0176-2680 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.07.003 |
| Popis: | We study whether the number of signatures collected to qualify a popular initiative affects the probability of reforming the status quo. The initiative process is modeled as a sequential game under uncertainty: petitioners make an entry decision and collect signatures to qualify the initiative. Politicians decide about a political compromise – a counter proposal – after which petitioners have the option to withdraw the initiative before the vote. In equilibrium, politicians infer the initiative's popularity from the number of signatures and collection time. The more the initiative is perceived as a threat to the status quo, the more likely politicians come up with a counter proposal. Under certain conditions, petitioners have the incentive to collect more signatures than required for qualification to demonstrate high success probability. We test model predictions using the data set of all Swiss constitutional initiatives at the federal level between 1891 and 2010. Overall, we find supporting evidence for the model mechanisms. Fast signature collection is associated with a higher probability of reform. The effect is mediated through a higher probability of provoking a counter proposal. Ultimately, counter proposals are key to amending the status quo. Restricting the signature collection time reduces the informative mechanism of the signature collection process considerably. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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