| Autor: |
Juan Manuel Abal Medina, Ernesto Calvo |
| Rok vydání: |
2002 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Electoral Studies. 21:453-471 |
| ISSN: |
0261-3794 |
| DOI: |
10.1016/s0261-3794(01)00011-7 |
| Popis: |
An unintended result of Mexico's hybrid electoral system is that 40% of the candidates may increase their chances to be elected for Congress as their party loses votes, while 60% of the candidates increase their chances to be elected as their parties gain votes. Because parties have to decide how to distribute candidates among single-member and multi-member districts some time before the election, this “double road” to representation sets the scenario for a new type of institutional gambling. Candidates face a dilemma: their chances of being elected improve dramatically if they run as single-member district candidates (lower tier) of the winning party or in the closed list (upper tier) of losing parties. This article shows that both electoral uncertainty and party switching incentives grow as a function of the majoritarian bias found in the single-member districts of Mexico's hybrid system. We introduce an extension of King and Browning's (American Political Science Review 81 (1987) 1252) model that represents a party's expected seat gain under both a mixed and a hybrid electoral system, and that captures the distortions produced by a ceiling on the maximum number of representatives that a party can elect to congress. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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Full Text from ScienceDirect