Computing Nash Equilibria of Unbounded Games

Autor:	Paulo Oliva, Martín Hötzel Escardó
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Subgame perfect equilibrium symbols.namesake Computability theory Nash equilibrium Backward induction Best response symbols Coordination game Risk dominance Epsilon-equilibrium Mathematical economics Mathematics
Zdroj:	Turing-100
ISSN:	2398-7340
Popis:	Using techniques from higher-type computability theory and proof theory we extend the well-known game-theoretic technique of backward induction to finite games of unbounded length. The main application is a closed formula for calculating strategy profiles in Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium even in the case of games where the length of play is not a-priori fixed.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1f08353b1d906fe0f43a2fb077b0823a https://doi.org/10.29007/1wpl Zobrazit plný text záznamu