Efficient Mixing of Arbitrary Ballots with Everlasting Privacy: How to Verifiably Mix the PPATC Scheme
| Autor: | Thomas Haines, Kristian Gjøsteen, Morten Rotvold Solberg |
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| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Scheme (programming language)
021110 strategic defence & security studies Computer science business.industry Electronic voting media_common.quotation_subject 0211 other engineering and technologies Homomorphic encryption 02 engineering and technology Computer security computer.software_genre Encryption Term (time) Voting 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing business computer ElGamal encryption media_common Quantum computer computer.programming_language |
| Zdroj: | Secure IT Systems ISBN: 9783030708511 NordSec |
| Popis: | The long term privacy of voting systems is of increasing concern as quantum computers come closer to reality. Everlasting privacy schemes offer the best way to manage these risks at present. While homomorphic tallying schemes with everlasting privacy are well developed, most national elections, using electronic voting, use mixnets. Currently the best candidate encryption scheme for making these kinds of elections everlastingly private is PPATC, but it has not been shown to work with any mixnet of comparable efficiency to the current ElGamal mixnets. In this work we give a paper proof, and a machine checked proof, that the variant of Wikstrom’s mixnet commonly in use is safe for use with the PPATC encryption scheme. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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