Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results

Autor:	Fabrice Barthélémy, Mathieu Martin
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Computer science Voting media_common.quotation_subject ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING Weighted voting Cooperative game theory Mathematical economics media_common
Zdroj:	Studies in Choice and Welfare ISBN: 9783030485979
DOI:	10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_13
Popis:	This chapter is a companion paper of Barthelemy et al. (2019) which studies the role of the quota on the occurrence of “dummy” players in small weighted voting games (i.e., in voting games with 3, 4 or 5 players). We here extend the results obtained in this paper by considering voting games with a larger number of players (up to 15). It is shown that the probability of having a player without voting power is very sensitive to the choice of the quota and the quota values that minimize this probability are derived.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1d234fa000d528555d1cdf317e4c998b https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_13 Zobrazit plný text záznamu