On Content-Independent Reasons: It’s Not in the Name
Autor: | Stefan Sciaraffa |
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Rok vydání: | 2008 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Law and Philosophy. 28:233-260 |
ISSN: | 1573-0522 0167-5249 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10982-008-9037-7 |
Popis: | Content-independence of commands lies in the fact that a commander may issue many different commands to the same or to different people and the actions commanded may have nothing in common, yet in the case of all of them the commander intends his expressions of intention to be taken as a reason for doing them. It is therefore intended to function as a reason independently of the nature or character of the actions to be done. In this case of course it differs strikingly from the standard paradigmatic cases of reasons for action where between the reason and the action there is a connection of content: there the reason may be some valued or desired consequence to which the action is a means, (my reason for shutting the window was to keep out the cold) or it may be some circumstance given which the action functions as a means to such a desired consequence (my reason for shutting the window was that I felt cold.) |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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