| Popis: |
Investigating the foundations of quantum field theories, I have suggested that theory specification has a pragmatic dimension: strategies for equipping physical theories with content, if sensibly pursued, eventuate in contents indexed not only (or not just) to the way the world is, but also to our aims in using our theories and the circumstances we use them in. Here I assess the “fundamentalist” response, that the apparent appeal of pragmatizing content rests on transient artifacts of the present incomplete state of physics. Fundamental physics, the response continues, can be properly understood if only it’s understood as representing the way the world is. Insofar as none of the physics we have now is genuinely fundamental, we can’t directly assess this fundamentalist response. Undertaking an indirect assessment, I develop two reasons to predict that future scientific theories, including theories of “fundamental physics,” will continue to be best understood as possessing pragmatized content. |
