Do Higher Wages Reduce Knowledge Worker's Job Mobility? Evidence for Swedish Inventors
| Autor: | Olof Ejermo, Torben Schubert |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Labour economics
Opportunity cost Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Wage Knowledge worker Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business Value (economics) Economics 050207 economics Business and International Management 050203 business & management media_common Panel data |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Management Studies. 55:108-145 |
| ISSN: | 0022-2380 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/joms.12317 |
| Popis: | Based on linked employer-employee panel data on all Swedish inventors, this paper analyses how wages affect inventors' job mobility. It is commonly assumed that higher wages reduce mobility because they reduce the value of outside opportunities. We argue that higher wages also send performance signals to potential employers, who raise their wage offers in response. By disentangling the effects of higher wages, we show evidence of a utility and an opportunity cost effect, which reduce mobility, and a performance-signalling effect, which increases mobility. In our data, the effects cancel each other out, with no effects of wages on mobility rates on average. We find, however, that for star inventors, who have sufficiently strong alternative performance signals (e.g., strong patent records), the performance signal sent by wages is crowded out by the alternative signals. Accordingly, for star inventors we find that higher wages decrease mobility. (Less) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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