Congressional oversight and electoral accountability
| Autor: | Austin Bussing, Michael Pomirchy |
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| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Theoretical Politics. 34:35-58 |
| ISSN: | 1460-3667 0951-6298 |
| DOI: | 10.1177/09516298211061516 |
| Popis: | Legislative oversight allows Congress to investigate potential wrongdoing by executive branch actors. We present a model in which an incumbent exercises oversight and chooses to take corrective action against the executive before going up for reelection. We show that partisan types who prefer to take corrective action regardless of the probability of wrongdoing will always conduct oversight, but sincere types who only want to correct legitimate wrongdoing will exercise restraint to avoid appearing too partisan and losing reelection. The model also shows that oversight is increasing in the probability that the incumbent is partisan and the probability that the challenger is sincere. Finally, we present two case studies, the Elián González custody case and the attack on the Benghazi embassy, to illustrate our theory. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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