More About Duties to Oneself
| Autor: | Warner Wick |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 1960 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Ethics. 70:158-163 |
| ISSN: | 1539-297X 0014-1704 |
| DOI: | 10.1086/291269 |
| Popis: | MARCUS SINGER, in the April number of this journal ("On Duties to Oneself"), finds that, "taken literally, the idea [of a duty to oneself] involves a contradiction." It appears to follow, then, that "what are called [my emphasis] 'duties to oneself' are either not genuine moral duties at all, or if they are, they are not duties to oneself" (his emphasis). But since the distinction between duties to oneself and duties to others "seems well-imbedded both in traditional moral philosophy and in ordinary moral thinking," and since "many would agree that [it] is both genuine and important," Singer is encouraged to look for some non-literal interpretation for this manner of speaking and thinking. He concludes that, while talk of duties to oneself must be figurative, it nevertheless serves "an interesting function in moral discourse." To say, "I owe it to myself," would be like "I promised myself a vacation"-"an appeal to self-interest disguised in the language of duty" and therefore a way of making the worse appear the better, or at least the more exalted cause. Speculation about such obliquities of speech would lose most of its point, of course, were it not for the prior conclusion that a duty to oneself is literally impossible. It is upon that prior issue that I wish to concentrate, because it has important implications for one's conception of morality in general and of moral duty in particular, which take precedence over the question why, if we cannot really have duties to ourselves, in the meaning of "duty" that Singer recognizes, we should persist in speaking and thinking as if we could and did. Rather than being a matter of detail, then, I think this question of obligations to ourselves involves us in one of the great divides of ethical theory. I shall argue that in the strict and primary sense of the "moral" and "the moral point of view,"' there are no specifically moral duties unless we have some to ourselves; and as a corollary I shall add that the sort of duties, and the meaning of "duty," on which Singer bases his argument are better called legal than peculiarly moral, although as duties they are not, of course, reducible to selfinterest. In addition, then, to Singer's single distinction between the prudential and the generically moral, I should add a further one, subordinate to that, between the legally or externally obligatory and what is alone in keeping with the moral point of view. It is indeed my duty to pay my taxes, whether or not it may be prudent in the circumstances. The law is completely satisfied if I perform as required; and a gang of rascals, scrupulous about its obligations to the Director of Internal Revenue, is so far blameless. But the moral point of view is not satisfied with this. Perhaps these miscreants were only evading federal jurisdiction? Without reference to what is moral in a further sense, "moral duties" would be a redundant expression. To whom, in such a case, is this further duty owed? Not to the government or its agents, nor to us law-abiding citizens; performance is all any of us have a right to exact. The same would go for humanity, if it is relevant at all; and I think we can leave God out of this. Without duties to ourselves in a sense to be explained, I shall argue, the moral point of view makes no sense. That is why a good deal hangs on Singer's alleged contradiction. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|