| Autor: |
Christina L. Boyd, Ethan D. Boldt, Ian Ostrander, Michael J. Nelson |
| Rok vydání: |
2021 |
| Zdroj: |
The Politics of Federal Prosecution |
| DOI: |
10.1093/oso/9780197554685.003.0007 |
| Popis: |
This chapter examines U.S. Attorneys’ decisions regarding charging and bargaining with federal criminal defendants. Based on our theoretical expectations about the importance of political responsiveness in prosecutorial decisions, we expect that prosecutors will be less likely to demonstrate leniency in providing charge reductions and offering substantial assistance downward sentencing departures when their political principals and local public send strong signals regarding their prosecutorial priorities for a given area of crime. We test this expectation empirically, relying on DOJ and U.S. Sentencing Commission data on federal violent crimes. We find evidence that political responsiveness helps drive prosecutorial behavior for both charge reductions and substantial assistance departures. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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