A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
| Autor: | Allan Drazen, S. Boragan Aruoba, Razvan Vlaicu |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Perfect information Microeconomics Incentive Order (exchange) 0502 economics and business Accountability Agency (sociology) Economics 050207 economics Governor Welfare Selection (genetic algorithm) 050205 econometrics media_common |
| Zdroj: | International Economic Review. 60:517-545 |
| ISSN: | 1468-2354 0020-6598 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/iere.12361 |
| Popis: | This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the eects of electoral ac- countability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection eects, using data on U.S. governors for 1982-2012. We …nd that the possibility of reelection provides a signi…cant incentive for incumbents to exert eort. We also …nd a selection eect, although it is weaker in terms of its eect on average governor performance. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4:2% compared to a one-term regime, and …nd that a three-term regime may improve voter welfare even further. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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