Exzess: Hardware-Based RAM Encryption Against Physical Memory Disclosure
| Autor: | Tilo Müller, Johannes Götzfried, Alexander Würstlein, Michael Gernoth |
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| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Flat memory model
Computer science business.industry Uniform memory access 02 engineering and technology Overlay Memory map Extended memory Physical address Memory management Shared memory 020204 information systems 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing business Computer hardware |
| Zdroj: | Architecture of Computing Systems – ARCS 2016 ISBN: 9783319306940 ARCS |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-319-30695-7_5 |
| Popis: | The main memory of today's computers contains lots of sensitive data, in particular from applications that have been used recently. As data within RAM is stored in cleartext, it is exposed to attackers with physical access to a system. In this paper we introduce Exzess, a hardware-based mitigation against physical memory disclosure attacks such as, for example, cold boot and DMA attacks. Our FPGA-based prototype with accompanying software components demonstrates the viability, security and performance of our novel approach for partial main memory encryption via memory proxies. The memory proxy approach will be compared to other existing mitigation techniques and possible further uses beyond encryption will be discussed, as well. Exzess effectively protects against physical attacks on main memory while being transparent to applications and the operating system after initialization. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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