| Popis: |
Is it true that French labor judges are contributing to the massive delay in labor grievances because of their politicized background? Is it true that lawyers are self-interested actors that stretch the duration of lawsuits solely to receive higher attorney’s fees? The answers are mixed. This manuscript intends to address the almost neglected crucial issue of delay in labor courts, fitting in the stream of law and economic literature, with particular reference to the analysis of decision-making processes. Most of the studies on the role of judges and attorneys on delay are concentrated in different areas of civil and criminal law in the United States. Very few quantitative studies have addressed this critical issue on French employment tribunals, which are a unique and ancient labor institution in the European panorama. Among the anomalies, these courts are composed of non-professional judges, with short legal training and elected directly among trade unions members and employer associations’ representatives. The role of the litigation market of attorneys on delay is almost neglected, while earlier work has concluded that judges that belong to the most confrontational syndicates play an essential role in litigation stonewalling and judicial delay, once elected in the labor judiciary. This contribution, with the assistance of two-stage least squared estimation techniques, intends to assess the role of these alleged confrontational judges on the litigation process, as well as the role of attorneys on delay, notwithstanding that they are the most qualified and technical actors in the litigation process. |
