Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs

Autor:	Dipjyoti Majumdar, Arunava Sen
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Bayesian probability 16. Peace & justice Microeconomics Incentive compatibility Voting 0502 economics and business International political economy Economics 050207 economics Function (engineering) Social choice theory Social Sciences (miscellaneous) 050205 econometrics Social policy media_common Public finance
Zdroj:	Social Choice and Welfare. 57:63-95
ISSN:	1432-217X 0176-1714
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-020-01304-9
Popis:	We investigate a voting model where each voter’s beliefs are positively correlated. We show that requiring a social choice function to be Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible (d’Aspremont and Peleg in Soc Choice Welf 5:261–280, 1988) with respect to all such beliefs is not equivalent to requiring it to be strategy-proof. However, if the social choice function is also required to be efficient, it must be strategy-proof and hence, dictatorial.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::12f1ef1125dfc124810dff701aba1cc4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01304-9 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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