| Popis: |
This chapter examines the attitude of the USSR toward the Shah and the Revolution. The author argues that, in spite of many sore points and contrasting strategic postures, the Kremlin preferred stability under the Shah to uncertainties inherent in the revolutionary turmoil in which Moscow had played no role. When by the year-end the Kremlin concluded that the Shah was irreparably damaged, they opted for support of the radical clergy, which they deemed most inclined to shout out the West. The dormant Tudeh Party structure in Leipzig, German Democratic Republic, was revamped and the hard-nosed pro-Moscow communist Nureddin Kianuri, who had all along advocated the pro-Khomeini line, was made its new leader. Lapsed or lingering communists and Tudeh sympathizers had by then spontaneously regrouped in cells that soon linked up with Leipzig. |
