Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem
| Autor: | Kazuo Yamaguchi |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Computer science
General Social Sciences General Decision Sciences Social Welfare Space (commercial competition) Minimax Lexicographical order Facility location problem Computer Science Applications Subgame perfect equilibrium Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous) Unanimity Developmental and Educational Psychology Taxicab geometry General Economics Econometrics and Finance Mathematical economics Applied Psychology |
| Zdroj: | Theory and Decision. 93:69-104 |
| ISSN: | 1573-7187 0040-5833 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11238-021-09838-9 |
| Popis: | We consider a spatial bargaining model where players collectively choose a facility location on a two-dimensional rectilinear distance space through bargaining using the unanimity rule. We show that as players become infinitely patient, their stationary subgame perfect equilibrium utilities converge to the utilities that satisfy the lexicographic maximin utility criterion introduced by Sen (Collective choice and social welfare, 1970). |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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