| Popis: |
BOOK REVIEWS The Papers of George Washington. Presidential Series, Volume 9: September 1791-February 1792. Edited by Mark A. Mastromarino and Jack D. Warren. Philander D. Chase, Series Editor. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000. Pp. xxxiv, 672. $62.50.) The Presidential Series of the Papers of George Washington form one section of the partially completed seven-unit, forty-six-volume compilation of documents produced by, or sent to, America's most famous person. Volume 9 addresses six critical months in the Washington administration, from September 1791 to February 1792. Some of the issues the president faced included controversies in developing the new federal capital; the nomination of ministers to London, Paris, and The Hague; and the government's decision on sending weapons to help suppress the slave uprising on Saint Domingue. Above all, the event that shook the United States during this period was the virtual annihilation of its army on November 4, 1791, at the hands of the First Nations of the Old Northwest. For this reviewer that last event is the most interesting story that can be followed through the volume because of its place in the larger struggles for control of the Great Lakes between 1754 and 1814. This volume offers a variety of enlightening correspondence for the weeks leading up to the aboriginal victory, such as a letter from Secretary of War Henry Knox that summarized the ambivalent thoughts of the expedition's commander, Arthur St. Clair, on his prospects for the looming confrontation. Another fascinating document is a report on the diplomatic dance then taking place among the Americans, the Six Nations Iroquois, and the British to protect their differing interests as they awaited the outcome of the approaching confrontation between the Western Tribes and the United States. These are followed by the first reports of St. Clair's disaster, which arrived in the capital on December 8, 1791. Of these, that of one battalion commander, William Darke, is particularly interesting. Darke conveyed a vivid sense of the confused desperation that marked the action and made a not-atypical attempt to exonerate his own performance and that of his fellow officers by shifting most of the blame for the rout to the panic-struck lower ranks, who, he wrote, could not be brought into line to perform their duty. Darke also noted that he thought "the Slaughter far Grater than Bradocks" (163), an interesting observation given American fondness for remembering the 1755 British defeat on the Monongahela but not the American one on the Wabash, perhaps because the former affirms national myths while the latter threatens them. Once news of the disaster tore through the capital, politicians leapt into action to promote their respective agendas. Washington's first report to the House of Representatives calmly referred to "the misfortune which has befallen the troops" and, while admitting that the loss of life was "considerable," quickly moved on to state that "it may be repaired without great difficulty" (274). These sentiments, of course, were expressed without his being certain that Congress would allow him to raise a new army and without having enough details at hand to assess the magnitude of the frontier crisis with any precision. The coolness of Washington's public statement also contrasted with his angry private outburst to news of the defeat as witnessed at one of Martha Washington's weekly receptions (275). By Christmas, his administration had developed plans to replace the lost army and attempted to undermine politicians who argued for a peaceful settlement by asserting that hostilities were necessary because the aboriginal people not only had rejected government offers to promote peace "upon the terms of justice and humanity" (314) but had fallen under the machinations of "malignant and turbulent characters" (317) who stoked their desires for "plunder and trophies" (320). … |
