Optimal Contract Design for Purchasing From Frequency Regulation Service Providers With Private Information
| Autor: | Aras Sheikhi, Ali Mohammad Ranjbar, Mohammad Rayati |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Operations research
020209 energy Revelation principle As is Energy Engineering and Power Technology 02 engineering and technology Service provider Electrical grid Purchasing Information asymmetry Incentive compatibility 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Business Electrical and Electronic Engineering Private information retrieval |
| Zdroj: | IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. 34:2445-2448 |
| ISSN: | 1558-0679 0885-8950 |
| Popis: | In this letter, an incentive compatible contract is designed for purchasing energy and ancillary service (AS) simultaneously from strategic frequency regulation service providers (FRSPs) by considering information asymmetries between independent system operator and FRSPs. Here, AS is confined to frequency reserve (FR) for arresting nadir frequency following possible contingencies of the electrical grid. An FRSP has a multi-dimensional private information vector, which determines its operational cost and limitations. Moreover, there is a gaming opportunity for an FRSP that is arisen between energy and AS payments manifesting by manipulation of its bids. Thus, in this letter, a multi-object contract is designed by using the revelation principle to optimally allocate energy and FR among FRSPs. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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