APPLICATIONS OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY DECISION MAKING

Autor:	Jennifer C. Coats
Rok vydání:	2002
Předmět:	Service (business) Government Public Administration Public economics business.industry Principal–agent problem Public policy Accounting Variety (cybernetics) Outsourcing Order (business) Accountability Economics Business and International Management business
Zdroj:	International Journal of Public Administration. 25:441-461
ISSN:	1532-4265 0190-0692
DOI:	10.1081/pad-120013250
Popis:	This paper surveys literature from Economics, Accounting, and Management to address theoretical issues in Public Administration regarding government provided services in order to contribute to a formal connection between principal-agent models in these disciplines and public policy administration decision-making. In particular, it addresses the question: What theoretical properties of the services themselves might guide (a) the choice of producer of the services (government or outsourcing firm/contractor), and (b) the accountability imposed for the work produced. It is found that a theoretical framework of principal-agent models that includes the decision of whether to contract out can be useful as a first step in systematically formulating the government's decision for a variety of goods/services. This provides an alterative to the identification of key decision properties “from the ground up” for each good or service the government provides.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::10ffc24add6977ce18fba2ee0b30d818 https://doi.org/10.1081/pad-120013250 Zobrazit plný text záznamu