| Popis: |
The World Health Organization warns that COVID-19, air pollution, and climate change are the leading global public health threats. Meanwhile, tobacco is the single most preventable cause of death and a secondary component of air pollution, which leads to more than 8.2 million annual excess deaths worldwide. Over 10% of tobacco-related deaths result from passive smokers exposed to second-hand smoke. There is no safe level of exposure to second-hand smoke and applying a completely smoke-free environment is the only effective strategy for prevention. The research documented in the doctoral thesis applies game theory such as multi-player regular and extensive game models with actual case data in assessing the smoke-free law's effectiveness. It represents a structured comparison between the Peoples Republic of China and Germany regarding legislation, application, and enforcement. The first research question is, "Are non-smoking areas 100% smoke-free in China and Germany?". It represents a prejudgment of the smoke-free status quo based on counterexample's within the two nations. The main research question is, "Why do active smokers take the risk of breaking the law in non-smoking areas?". It leads to simulations evaluating decision-making of the interactions between the active smoker and the other players from the perspective of policy regulators. The answers to these two questions aim to provide input for better smoke-free legislation with recommendations for China and Germany. New institutional economics explains how rules matter in game theory as a basis of theories and methods. Game theory served to structure the research program. Furthermore, it was deployed as a source of methods useful for framing the smoke-free game model along with the computation of Nash equilibria in this research. The calculation of typical 3-player strategic games uses a payoff matrix and computer-based Gambit software in the extensive game setup. The supporting theories are expectation, utility, and bounded rationality elements. The supporting methods are represented by logical analysis, field research, and comparative research. These means were applied throughout the entire process of game-theoretical model formulation and simulations. From a sequential perspective, the process was initiated for Hong Kong. Eventually, the results were used to form a universal comparative smoke-free game model for simulations focusing on the cities Shenzhen and Bayreuth. The results show that the answer to the first research question is NO. Several counterexamples prove that both China and Germany have yet still to achieve a 100% smoke-free level. The answer to the main research question is tested repeatedly in every model simulation before concluding that the expected payoff for active smokers who choose to smoke is higher than the payoff of not smoking. For the ultimate goal of the smoke-free regulator, the balance ratios evaluating active smoking risk stand at -105.66% in Hong Kong, -88% in Bayreuth, and -15.84% in Shenzhen. Shenzhen is the best, but it still needs more effort to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating active smoking. The monetary turning point in Hong Kong is HK$597.5, with an invalid range from 60.16% to 88.05%. Simultaneously, the turning point in Shenzhen is Y302 with valid or invalid for 39.6%, and €24 in Bayreuth with an invalid range from 40% to 97.6%. Applying the stated criteria, the compliance ranking is as follow: the latest smoke-free law in Hong Kong is the best, Shenzhen law 2013 version is the second, and Bavaria is the third. However, other criteria may need to be applied in further research in the context of effort aiming at reducing second hand smoking. |
