Collective Deterrence in the Shadow of Shifting Power
| Autor: | Julianne Phillips, Scott Wolford |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Power (social and political)
021110 strategic defence & security studies Sociology and Political Science Political science 05 social sciences Political Science and International Relations Deterrence (psychology) 050602 political science & public administration 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology 0506 political science Law and economics Shadow (psychology) |
| Zdroj: | International Studies Quarterly. 65:136-145 |
| ISSN: | 1468-2478 0020-8833 |
| Popis: | Twelve of twenty-six war-winning coalitions since 1815 have seen at least two members go to war against one another after victory. What separates durable and fragile war-winning coalitions? To answer this question, we analyze a game-theoretic model of shifting intra-coalition power and collective deterrence. We show that (1) shifting power within war-winning coalitions can undermine commitments to the postwar settlement, but (2) revisionist threats from a powerful defeated side can enhance the credibility of commitments within the winning coalition, securing peace when intra-coalition war would otherwise be inevitable. We also recover these patterns in empirical models of the outbreak of war between former coalition partners: shifting power within a coalition is associated with increased probabilities of intra-coalition war, but only when the defeated side is not too powerful. A common enemy can thus preserve peace between former partners who would otherwise go to war over the terms of shared victory. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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