Precarious Investments and Blame Gaming - Adverse Effects and the Inherent Danger of Simplification

Autor: Frode Kjærland, Levi Gårseth-Nesbakk
Rok vydání: 2016
Předmět:
Zdroj: Financial Accountability & Management. 32:281-308
ISSN: 0267-4424
DOI: 10.1111/faam.12097
Popis: This blame game study reports on attempts by eight municipalities to recover money in the wake of financial losses resulting from the financial crisis. Actor‐network theory helps unravel which actors were involved in creating the blame game and those who were mobilized to facilitate it, which resulted in judicial losses and substantial advisory service fees. The evidence suggests that punctualization can be costly when dealing with precarious investments and engaging in blame gaming, as simplifications might evoke adverse effects. Contributions relate to group formation and the use of experts in blame gaming and addressing related strategies as heterogeneous network effects.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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