International Cooperation: Testing Evolution of Cooperation Theories
| Autor: | Jeremy Bowling |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology Management Monitoring Policy and Law Reciprocity (evolution) 0506 political science Scholarship Political Science and International Relations 050602 political science & public administration Sociology Positive economics Social psychology Reputation media_common |
| Zdroj: | Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. 23 |
| ISSN: | 1554-8597 1079-2457 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/peps-2016-0020 |
| Popis: | The evolution of cooperation scholarship develops evolutionary stable theories that explain the presence of cooperation when there are many reasons to defect from cooperation. In this analysis, these theories are tested using the relations between states. Focusing on the direct reciprocity strategies of Tit-for-Tat and Win-stay/Lose-shift and the indirect reciprocity strategies of Cooperative Reputation and Tag, Tit-for-Tat and Cooperative Reputation are found to be robust, while Tags have mixed results. In the end, it is the direct cooperative action by states and their cooperative reputation and not shared characteristics that are most likely to elicit cooperative action in return. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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