Leibniz on Divine Concurrence
| Autor: | Sukjae Lee |
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| Rok vydání: | 2004 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | The Philosophical Review. 113:203-248 |
| ISSN: | 1558-1470 0031-8108 |
| DOI: | 10.1215/00318108-113-2-203 |
| Popis: | A divine concurrentist, in general, intends to satisfy two theses that were held by the vast majority of theologians and theistic philosophers of the seventeenth century, not to mention the Middle Ages: (1) Creatures or finite substances have real causal powers, and (2) God's causal power is immediately and directly present in every aspect of the world, including those very effects thought to be brought about by creatures. Hence, the creature and God concurin bringing about the effect. The problem, as one might suspect, is that it is not obvious how, or even whether, the two requirements can be met simultaneously. Leibniz faced this challenge in the form of Malebranche's occasionalism. Malebranche argues that a certain understanding of the directness and immediacy of God's causal involvement requires one to give up the claim that creatures have genuine causal powers. His most persuasive argument is founded on the principle that "conservation is but continuous creation." 1The idea is that since God conserves the world |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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