Expert deference as a belief revision schema
| Autor: | Joe Roussos |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Computer science
business.industry Decision theory Credence 05 social sciences Posterior probability Deference General Social Sciences Proposition 06 humanities and the arts Belief revision 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Philosophy of language Philosophy Schema (psychology) 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Artificial intelligence business |
| Zdroj: | Synthese. 199:3457-3484 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 0039-7857 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-020-02942-3 |
| Popis: | When an agent learns of an expert’s credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This is a popular thought about how agents ought to respond to (ideal) experts. In a Bayesian framework, it is often modelled by endowing the agent with a set of priors that achieves this result. But this model faces a number of challenges, especially when applied to non-ideal agents (who nevertheless interact with ideal experts). I outline these problems, and use them as desiderata for the development of a new model. Taking inspiration from Richard Jeffrey’s development of Jeffrey conditioning, I develop a model in which expert reports are taken as exogenous constraints on the agent’s posterior probabilities. I show how this model can handle a much wider class of expert reports (for example reports of conditional probabilities), and can be naturally extended to cover propositions for which the agent has no prior. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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