Cyclic Pricing When Customers Queue with Rating Information
| Autor: | Pengfei Guo, Yulan Wang, Fengfeng Huang |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Service system
021103 operations research 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology Management Science and Operations Research Service provider Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Microeconomics Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business Average price Potential market Key (cryptography) Profitability index Business Queue Game theory 050203 business & management |
| Zdroj: | Production and Operations Management. 28:2471-2485 |
| ISSN: | 1937-5956 1059-1478 |
| Popis: | Consider a situation where a service provider serves two types of customers, sophisticated and naive. Sophisticated customers are well-informed of service-related information and make their joining-or-balking decisions strategically, whereas naive customers do not have such information and rely on online rating information to make such decisions. We demonstrate that under certain conditions a service provider can increase its profitability by simply `dancing' its price, that is, replacing the static pricing strategy with a high-low cyclic pricing strategy. The success of this strategy relies on two key conditions: the potential market size is large enough so that congestion is a key concern in the service system, and the rating provides the average price and average utility information. Finally, we show that the cyclic pricing strategy is not socially optimal. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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