Graphene-based physically unclonable functions that are reconfigurable and resilient to machine learning attacks
| Autor: | Parijat Sengupta, Saptarshi Das, Shiva Subbulakshmi Radhakrishnan, Thomas F. Schranghamer, Drew Buzzell, Akhil Dodda |
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| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Hardware security module
Artificial neural network Computer science Graphene business.industry Transistor Physical unclonable function Dirac (software) Machine learning computer.software_genre Electronic Optical and Magnetic Materials law.invention law Scalability Hardware_INTEGRATEDCIRCUITS Artificial intelligence Electrical and Electronic Engineering business Instrumentation computer Voltage |
| Zdroj: | Nature Electronics. 4:364-374 |
| ISSN: | 2520-1131 |
| DOI: | 10.1038/s41928-021-00569-x |
| Popis: | Graphene has a range of properties that makes it suitable for building devices for the Internet of Things. However, the deployment of such devices will also likely require the development of suitable graphene-based hardware security primitives. Here we report a physically unclonable function (PUF) that exploits disorders in the carrier transport of graphene field-effect transistors. The Dirac voltage, Dirac conductance and carrier mobility values of a large population of graphene field-effect transistors follow Gaussian random distributions, which allow the devices to be used as a PUF. The resulting PUF is resilient to machine learning attacks based on predictive regression models and generative adversarial neural networks. The PUF is also reconfigurable without any physical intervention and/or integration of additional hardware components due to the memristive properties of graphene. Furthermore, we show that the PUF can operate with ultralow power and is scalable, stable over time and reliable against variations in temperature and supply voltage. Disorder in the charge carrier transport of graphene-based field-effect transistors can be used to construct physically unclonable functions that are secure and can withstand advanced computational attacks. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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