Responsibility - Beyond Resentment and Indignation
| Autor: | Robert Albin |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of science Resentment media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Indignation Epistemology Philosophy of language Philosophy 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Moral responsibility Psychology media_common |
| Zdroj: | Philosophia. 47:995-1009 |
| ISSN: | 1574-9274 0048-3893 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11406-018-0031-5 |
| Popis: | My aim in this article is to flesh out a new distinction between moral responsibility, as it is understood in light of Strawson’s “reactive attitudes,” and an institutional form of responsibility—a responsibility that employees bear for their work to their superiors. I show that Strawson’s view of responsibility is separate from organizational responsibility, and hence the responsibility of employees to their managers cannot be understood in terms of indignation or resentment, both of which are key Strawsonian concepts. The latter type of responsibility can be understood in terms of objective attitudes, managerial demands, organizational standards, and related expectations. Based on a Cartesian and a Wittgensteinian notions of asymmetry between first- and third-person uses of psychological concepts, Strawson developed a view of responsibility that dissolves the above asymmetry. In contrast with the latter asymmetry, which focuses on those who ascribe psychological concepts to themselves and to others, Strawson’s view is centered on the recipients of reactive attitudes. According to his view, resentment and indignation differ because they are aimed at different recipients, something that cannot be applied in cases of organizational responsibility. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full text from SpringerLink