The Virtues of Socratic Ignorance
| Autor: | Mary Margaret Mackenzie |
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| Rok vydání: | 1988 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | The Classical Quarterly. 38:331-350 |
| ISSN: | 1471-6844 0009-8388 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/s0009838800037009 |
| Popis: | Plato's Socrates denies that he knows. Yet he frequently claims that he does have certainty and knowledge. How can he avoid contradiction between his general stance about knowledge (that he lacks it) and his particular claims to have it?Socrates' disavowal of knowledge is central to his defence in theApology. For here he rebuts the accusation that he teaches – and thus corrupts – the young by telling the jury that he cannot teach just because he knows nothing. Hence his disavowal of knowledge is important to Socrates. Why does he make this claim? And how then can he justify engaging in any philosophical activity at all? |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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