Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information and Asymmetric Computational Resources
Autor: | Victoria L. Kreps, Misha Gavrilovich |
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Rok vydání: | 2018 |
Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Class (set theory) Finite-state machine Theoretical computer science General Computer Science Computer science 05 social sciences ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING Signal Automaton Zero-sum game Complete information 0502 economics and business 050206 economic theory Fraction (mathematics) State (computer science) Statistics Probability and Uncertainty Business and International Management 050205 econometrics |
Zdroj: | International Game Theory Review. 20:1750034 |
ISSN: | 1793-6675 0219-1989 |
DOI: | 10.1142/s0219198917500347 |
Popis: | We consider random public signals on the state of two-person zero-sum game with incomplete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game). To learn the state, each player chooses a finite automaton which receives the public signal; the player only sees the output of the automaton chosen. Supposing that the size of automata available to Player 1 is essentially bigger than that available to Player 2, we give an example of public signal with random length of output strings where the posterior belief of Player 1 is the state and the posterior belief of Player 2 is close to his original belief. Thus, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about the state of a game may appear not only due to a private signal but as a result of a public signal and asymmetric computational resources of players. Besides, for a class of random signals with fixed length of output strings, we estimate the fraction of signals such that some automaton of given size may help Player 2 to significantly reestimate prior probability of the state. We show that this fraction is negligible if the size of automata of Player 2 is sufficiently smaller than length of output strings. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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